Privacy has to outlive
the machines built to break it.

Ship usable privacy tools

Cryptography that nobody can operate protects nobody. Our first job is software people actually use every day, with the strongest available algorithms turned on by default rather than hidden behind an expert setting.

QuantumPost is the first →

Broaden the line

One application covers one part of a life. The research that went into QuantumPost — post-quantum transport, anonymity routing, key handling we cannot get wrong — carries into everything that follows it.

The line so far adds QryptVault, a key manager for every kind of key; a console that keeps virtual machines walled off; Vobella for mastering your own DVDs without uploading them anywhere, out now for Windows with its source on GitHub; and, next, QuantumPost on your phone.

The whole line →

Get our hands on quantum hardware

Access to a real quantum computer would let us attack our own cryptography with the machine it was designed to resist, and build entropy sources whose randomness is physical rather than computed. We would rather find our own weaknesses than have somebody else find them quietly.

Then put that hardware in your hands

A diamond chip in your own device, not only in a lab. Nitrogen-vacancy centres in synthetic diamond work at room temperature — almost every other quantum approach needs cooling near absolute zero, which rules out a consumer device before you start. It would draw your keys from a physical quantum process rather than a computed one, closing a gap that no amount of software can.

We are nowhere near this. No chip, no prototype, no timeline — it is the direction, not a product.

How we think about all four →